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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT J. DEBRY,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
-vGRAYSTONE PINES
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
Defendant and
Counterplaintiff/respondent
Cross-appellant,

No. 880430-CA
Category 14(b)

-vJOHN WEBSTER, ROY NIELSONf
FLORANCE LEWON, CARLOS CROFT,
and LOUISE MALLONEE, as the
BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION on behalf of
the owners of all units in
Graystone Pines Condominiums,
Intervenors and
Counterplaintiffs/respondents
and Cross-appellants.
JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDING BELOW
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah
Code Ann., and the Utah Supreme Court's order of referral dated
July 7, 1988.
This is an appeal from the trial court's summary judgment in
the defendant and intervenors/counterplaintiffs' favor.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
On Appeal.
I.
and

Is a provision purporting to give the attorney "complete

unfettered"

control

over

settlement

enforceable?
-1-

of

his

clients' case

II.

When a provision restricting the clients' right to settle

is held to be unenforceable, should an attorneyf as a result, be
entitled to a higher fee than he would have received had he not
included the offensive provision?
III.

Should

an

attorney

be

permitted

to

increase

his

attorney's fee by unreasonably refusing to consent to his client's
good faith settlement of the client's case?
IV.

Resolving

all

ambiguities

against

the

plaintiff

as

drafterf does the language of the fee agreement taken as a whole
restrict the Homeowners' right to accept a reasonable settlement
offer

or

is

the

restricting

language

limited

to

only

those

situations where the Homeowners refuse to accept an offer plaintiff
wished to accept?
V.

Resolving

all

ambiguities

against

the

plaintiff

as

drafter, does the language of the fee agreement taken as a whole
provide

that

in

the event

the Homeowners

settled

without

the

plaintiff's consent, the plaintiff's attorney's fee would, in the
alternative, be determined based on an hourly rate for the work
done.
VI.

Is

the

Homeowners'

representation

that

one

of

their

claims was "very substantial" a representation of fact that will
support plaintiff's claim that he was fraudulently induced into
entering into the contingent fee agreement, and if so, is plaintiff
precluded from making the claim by the 6 year lapse between the
time he claims to have discovered the alleged misrepresentation and
the time he first made his allegations known?

-2-

On Cross-appeal.
VII.

Does plaintiff's unreasonable refusal to accept payment

of the contingent

fee when the Homeowners settled their case,

preclude plaintiff

from

recovering

prejudgment

interest on the

contingent fee?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
Plaintiff Robert J. DeBry brought an action against Graystone
Pines Homeowners Association (hereinafter "Homeowners") and others
seeking recovery of an attorney's fee of $31,200, plus interest and
costs in connection with representation of the Homeowners in a
prior action.

The plaintiff claims he is entitled to a higher fee

than that provided in the contingent fee agreement because of the
Homeowners' alleged breach of a provision in the fee agreement
prohibiting
consent.

the

Homeowners

from

settling

without

plaintiff's

The Homeowners contended that plaintiff's attorney's fee

was limited to the contingent fee specified in the fee agreement,
which fee is $18f300.
Disposition below.
The Homeowners moved for partial summary judgment limiting the
plaintiff's attorney's fee to a maximum of $18f300.

The trial

court granted the Homeowners' motion but also ordered that interest
would accrue on the fee at the rate of 6% per annum.

The parties

subsequently stipulated that the partial summary judgment be made
final

judgment

fixing

plaintiff's

attorney's

without prejudice to the right to appeal.

-3-

fee

at $18,300,

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Provisions restricting the right
to settle are unenforceable.
As a matter

of

longstanding

public policy, provisions

in

attorneys' fee agreements purporting to limit the client's right to
settle or requiring that the attorney's consent be obtained first
have uniformly been held to be unenforceable.

The courts, on

various theories, hold with remarkable uniformity that an attorney
will not be permitted to recover an attorney's fee in excess of the
contingent

fee

percentage

as

a

result

of

a

restriction

settlement having been declared to be unenforceable.
hold

to discourage

furtherance

of

restrictions,

the

some

the

use

policy
courts

of
of

the repugnant
discouraging

have

gone

so

far

The courts so

provisions.
the
as

on

use
to

of
^imit

In
such
the

attorney's recovery to the reasonable value of his services under
quantum meruit, where calculation of the fee on that basis will
yield a fee lower than the contingent percentage.

The courts have

not used quantum meruit as a basis for awarding an attorney's fee
in excess of the contingent fee as plaintiff proposes in this case.
Plaintiff's unreasonable refusal to approve
the settlement precludes him from claiming more money.
In addition, plaintiff's

fee in this case

should

not be

permitted to exceed the contingent percentage of the Homeowners'
settlement

because

his

refusal

to approve

totally unjustified under the circumstances.

the

settlement

was

The settlement was

within the expected range and, indeed, was indisputably a very good
settlement.

Moreover, because plaintiff
-4-

would

have

to pay a

substitute attorney to try the case while plaintiff vacationed, the
Homeowners' settlement yielded a higher fee than plaintiff could
have received if the Homeowners won every point at trial.
Homeowners did not breach settlement agreement.
Even

if

the

restriction

on

settlement

were

otherwise

enforceable, the restriction was limited to those circumstances
where

the

Homeowners

unreasonably

refused

to

settle, thereby

unnecessarily forcing plaintiff to try the case.

As such, the

restriction did not apply in the instant case, and there was no
"breach" because the Homeowners settled to avoid trial.
The fee agreement does not provide in the
alternative for a fee at an hourly rate.
No reasonable person could

interpret the fee agreement to

provide, in the alternative, that if the Homeowners settled without
plaintiff's consent, his attorneys' fee would be calculated at an
hourly

rate.

The

language

relied

upon as

the basis for the

supposed "alternative fee" merely stated that if the Homeowners did
not wish to accept the contingent fee proposed, the plaintiff would
continue

to work

asserted

the

on an hourly rate.

language

of

the

fee

Plaintiff himself never

agreement

provided

in

the

alternative for a fee at hourly rates until first three years after
the fee dispute arose.
There is no basis for any claim that plaintiff
was fraudulently induced to enter the fee agreement.
Plaintiff's claim that he was fraudulently induced to enter
the contingent fee agreement and is therefore entitled to avoid its
terms is without factual or legal basis. At no time during the six
-5-

years following his discovery of the alleged fraud, did plaintiff
ever mention it to the Homeowners, nor did he allege any fraud in
any of the complaints filed in this case.

Plaintiff is therefore

precluded by the statute of limitations and waiver from asserting
any

claims

he might

have had

misrepresentation.

In

if there

any

event,

had been a fraudulent
the

only

fraudulent

representation alleged to have been relied on by plaintiff before
the

contingent

fee

agreement

was

entered,

namely,

that

the

Homeowners' claim was "very substantial," is not a representation
of fact that will support a claim of fraud.
Plaintiff is not entitled to
recover any interest.
Because plaintiff's
settlement

and

accept

refusal

to consent

the contingent

to the Homeowners'

fee provided

in the fee

agreement was unjustified, he is not entitled to recover interest
on the fee.

The delay in payment is entirely of his own making.

It would be particularly unjust to award interest in light of the
delays, expense, and stress he has unnecessarily inflicted on the
Homeowners in an effort to increase his fee.
interest

in this case must

be denied

Moreover, recovery of

to deter attorneys from

including restrictions on settlement in their fee agreements and
then pursuing harassing litigation against their clients who settle
in good faith.

In addition, in the absence of a specific agreement

providing for the accrual of interest on attorneys' fees, interest
should not be allowed lest the matter of interest be used as a
bargaining weapon by the lawyer in a fee dispute.

-6-

Sanctions should be imposed because
this appeal is frivolous.
There being no factual or legal basis for plaintiff's refusal
to approve the settlement and accept the contingent fee, or for his
claim that he was fraudulently induced to enter the fee agreement,
the

suit

and

Accordingly,
attorneys1

this

the

appeal

should

Homeowners

fees and

are

never

entitled

have
to

been

filed.

recover

their

double costs as the minimum

plaintiff's filing of a frivolous appeal.

sanction for

These sanctions are

authorized by Rule 33f Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and as
part

of

the

administration

court's
of

inherent

justice,

power,

to

in

impose

the

interest

sanctions

for

of

the

attorney

misconduct.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following Statement of Facts is based on the undisputed
facts in the record below.

For the court's convenience copies of

the most significant documents and affidavits in the record below
are included in numerical order in the attached addendum.

Those

record references that are found in the appendix are shown in bold
type.
A.

On November 9, 1978, Defendant Graystone Pines Homeowners

Association employed plaintiff to provide legal services on behalf
of the individual home owners of the 36 units comprising Graystone
Pines

Condominiums.

plaintiff

was

to

Under

receive

the
$50.00

initial
per

employment

hour

for

agreement,

work

done

in

prosecuting the Homeowners' claims against Graystone Pines, Inc.
and

the

corporation's

principals,
-7-

Busch,

Coulam

and

Jensen

(collectively referred to as the "developers") for the developers'
defective construction of the Homeowners1 condominiums.

R. 1003,

1017-1018.
B.

In a letter dated March 4, 1980f plaintiff proposed terms

for a new contingent

fee agreement

to replace the hourly fee

arrangement in response to the Homeowners1 concerns about the cost
of the litigation which had been much greater than plaintiff had
predicted.

Plaintiff stated that he believed that a reasonable

contingent fee under the circumstances to be 60% of any recovery.
But since plaintiff estimated that the litigation was half way
completed, he proposed that he be paid in full at his hourly rate
for the work already performed/ and then be paid an additional 30%
of any recovery obtained from the developers, thereby giving him
the equivalent of a 60% contingent fee. R. 1005-1007, 1018.
C.

The contingent fee agreement also provided that under

certain circumstances plaintiff would have "complete and unfettered
control" over the settlement of the Homeowners' claims against the
developers.

Plaintiff said he required control over settlement

because he felt that overly optimistic clients often turn down
reasonable settlement offers since they may pursue the case without
incurring any additional attorney's fees.
D.

R. 1006.

The Homeowners accepted DeBry's contingent fee proposal on

March 27, 1980. R* 1018.
E.

The first trial of the Homeowners' claims against the

developers was begun in September 1980 and lasted for two weeks.
At

the close of evidence, all of the Homeowners' claims were

dismissed.

R. 1018f 1633.
-8-

F.
claims.

Plaintiff

appealed

the

dismissal

of

the

Homeowners'

In July 1982f the Utah Supreme Court remanded all of the

Homeowners' claims except the "black substance" claim for a second
trial.

Management Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n v.

Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982).

The second trial

was set for mid-July, 1983. R. 1018-1019, 1634.
G.
to enter

After the first trial the plaintiff asked the Homeowners
settlement

which they did.

negotiations

The Homeowners kept plaintiff advised of each step

in the negotiation process.
to

the

developers

$98,470.

directly with the developers,

that

In March 1983 the Homeowners suggested

the

prior

litigation

be

settled

for

In May 1983 the developers responded that they were

willing to pay only $30,000 to settle the case.

The Homeowners

countered, with plaintiff's approval, with an offer to settle for
$75,000.

In early June 1983, about five weeks before the second

trial, the developers responded by rejecting the $75,000 offer and
offering to pay $47,000 to settle.

The highest settlement offer

the developers had made prior to completion of the first trial had
been $45,000. R. 1019, 1314, 1634-1635.
H.

After

further

negotiations,

in

mid-June

1983,

the

developers agreed to settle the case by paying the Homeowners
$61,000.

Plaintiff was informed of these negotiations and refused

to approve

the Homeowners' settlement with

the developers for

$61,000 or to accept the contingent fee of $18,300 (30% of 61,000)
as his fee.

In late June 1983, he told the Homeowners that if they

settled the case for $61,000 he would demand a fee of $31,300 based

-9-

on a rate of $50*00 per hour and his "reconstruction" of the number
of hours worked.

(Plaintiff had no time records to show the number

of hours worked,)

He told the Homeowners that he would not go

along with the settlement because he felt he could get more if the
case were tried.
I.

Prior

R. 679, 1011-1012, 1086-1087, 1635-1636.

to

refusing

to approve

the

$61r000

settlement,

plaintiff had told the Homeowners that they had a 75% chance of
recovering

between

R. 1019, 1634.

$50,000

and

$80,000

at

the

second

trial.

The total damage evidence introduced at the first

trial with respect to the claims at issue in the second trial was
$92,954.47.
J.

R. 307.

Plaintiff was going on vacation during the time scheduled

for the second trial, so he arranged to have a substitute attorney
(Robert B. Hansen) appear for the Homeowners at the second trial.
The substitute attorney was to receive up to 2/3 of plaintiff's 30%
contingent fee (20% of any recovery) as compensation for trying the
case.

R. 1014, 1636-1637.

K.

The substitute attorney's portion of the contingent fee

was to gradually increase as the trial date approached to reflect
the work that he would have to perform in preparation for and trial
of the case.

As the Homeowners understood it, if settled before

the first of July 1983, the other attorney would receive 5% of the
recovery.

If settled after that but before trial, he would receive

10% of the recovery and if settled after trial began, he would
receive a full 20% of any recovery.
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R. 1636-1637.

L.

Under

this arrangement, if all of the damage evidence

introduced in the first time on the remanded issues was accepted at
the second trial and the Homeowners were to prevail on all issues,
plaintiff's share of the maximum possible recovery after trial
would have been 10% of $92,954.47 or $9,295.45. R. 307. Plaintiff
acknowledged this possibility in a letter to the Homeowners dated
May 2, 1983 in which he said:
The arrangement would cost you no more because I
would pay Mr. Hansen [substitute counsel] out of my
contingent fee. I would plan to pay him a fee of 20%
(you pay me 30%). In fact this is a major financial
sacrifice on my part as it would leave me with perhaps
$10,000 for 3 years work.
R. 1014.
M.

At

the

time

he

refused

to

approve

the

settlement,

plaintiff knew that the Homeowners, older, retired people, were
weary of the stress and strain of litigation.
1637.

R. 1011, 1315,

He also knew that many of the Homeowners were on fixed

incomes and were very concerned about the expenses of litigation.
R. 1005, 1637f 1667-1668.
N.

At the time they settled the prior suit, the Homeowners

were ready, willing and able to pay plaintiff 30% of the settlement
as agreed and any additional costs that plaintiff could show were
due, but plaintiff refused to accept payment.
0.

R. 1246-1247, 1636.

The Homeowners concluded the settlement of their claims

against the developers with plaintiff's knowledge and assistance,
and

plaintiff

immediately

filed

suit

against

the

alleging the Homeowners had breached the fee agreement.
1012, 1086-1087, 1637.
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Homeowners
R. 1011-

P.

Eight months after initiation of his action against the

Homeowners, plaintiff moved

to amend his complaint

to add the

developers as parties to his suit for attorneys1 fees alleging that
the developers

had collusively

settled

with

the Homeowners

prevent plaintiff from receiving his attorney's fee.

R. 261.

to
The

amendment was permitted/ but the developers were later dismissed on
Summary Judgment from the case and no appeal from that ruling has
been pursued.
Q.

R. 446, 1277-1279.

Seventeen months after initiating the action against the

Homeowners, plaintiff moved to add the developers' attorneys. Snow,
Christensen & Martineau, in the prior litigation as a party to his
suit for attorneys1 fees alleging that the developers and their
attorneys had conspired
fee.

R. 539, 546.

to deprive plaintiff of his attorney's

Plaintiff also moved at that time to add one of

the Homeowners, John Webster, as a defendant alleging that Webster
had

conspired

R. 553, 562.

to

interfere

with

plaintiff's

attorney's

lien.

The developers' attorney and Mr. Webster were all

added as parties, but were later dismissed from the case on summary
judgment and no appeal has been taken from that ruling has been
pursued.
R.

R. 1272, 1277.
Twenty-two months after

initiating

the suit, plaintiff

moved to amend the complaint to add Commercial Security Bank as a
party

to his

suit

for

attorneys' fees because

the

settlement

proceeds had been deposited in Commercial Security Bank.
834, 844. The amendment was granted.
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R. 905, 971.

R. 831,

S.

Twenty-three months after initiating the suit to recover

attorneys' fees from the Homeowners, plaintiff moved to amend his
complaint to add the Homeowners' attorneys as a party to his suit
to

recover

attorneys'

fees

alleging

that

because

some

of

the

settlement proceeds had been used to pay the Homeowners' attorneys,
the attorneys should be made a part to the litigation.
The motion was denied and no appeal has been pursued.
T.

R. 1036.

Over 250 pleadings have been filed in this case, all but

approximately

27 related to the fee dispute.

than 1850 pages.
times.

R. 908.

The record is more

Plaintiff has moved to amend his complaint six

Three motions, alone, have been made by plaintiff attacking

the court's order granting the Homeowners partial summary judgment
from which
Objecting

this appeal
to

Form

Plaintiff's Motion

of

ultimately
Order

to Amend

and

resulted:
for

Judgment

Plaintiff's

Reconsideration
(R. 1391);

(R.

and

Motion
1232);

Plaintiff's

Motion to Vacate Partial Summary Judgment (R. 1534).
ARGUMENT
This is not a garden variety fee dispute between the attorney
and his client.
the

This appeal raises issues that go to the core of

attorney/client

prosecution

and

relationship

settlement

of

and

the

contingent

role
fee

of

each

cases.

in

The

the
rule

adopted by the court in this case will serve to define the nature
of the relationship between the attorney and client
negotiation

of

fee agreements and

the settlement

both in the

of cases.

At

stake is nothing less than the client's right to control his own
case and the integrity of the fiduciary relationship between the
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client and his attorney.

It is helpful at the outset to consider

the fundamental nature of the attorney/client relationship and some
of

the policies

the

law

ought

to advance

when

shaping

rules

affecting that relationship.
The

attorney/client

nature.

The client

relationship

necessarily

is

places

highly

fiduciary

in

the highest measure of

personal trust and confidence in the attorney and the attorney in
return

owes

faith.

the

client

absolute

fidelity

and

matchless

See 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorney at Law § 119 (1980).

good

In most

cases, particularly contingent fee cases, the client is unlearned
in the law and has had little, if any, experience dealing with
lawyers.

Because of the lawyer's expertise and the trust and

confidence the layman naturally places in his lawyer, the client is
not generally inclined nor particularly well equipped to bargain
with the lawyer regarding the terms of the fee agreement.

As a

practical matter, the client trusts, and ought to be able to trust,
his lawyer to prepare a fair fee agreement that complies with the
applicable ethical and legal standards.
Contingent fee agreements by their nature are in conflict with
the fiduciary relationship between the attorney and client, since
they give the attorney a financial interest in the outcome of his
client's

case.

Such

fee

agreements

have

nevertheless

been

permitted

in most civil cases to permit those without adequate

means to obtain legal representation.

In spite of the differing

interests

and

potential

because

interests

of

the

for

attorney

conflict
and

client

-14-

under

of

the differing
contingent

fee

agreements, they appear to work reasonably well, and for the most
part both lawyers and clients seem satisfied with them.
When conflicts do arise between the attorney and client under
a contingent fee agreement, they must be resolved in light of the
attorney's

status

notwithstanding

the

as

a

trusted

lawyer's

fiduciary

interest

belongs to the client, not the lawyer.

and

in the

the

fact

outcome,

the

that,
case

Consequently, the rules for

resolving conflicts should maximize the client's right to control
his own case, encourage the client to place trust and confidence in
his

lawyer, promote

potential

for

the settlement

disputes

between

of disputes and minimize the

the

attorney

and

client.

In

addition, the rules adopted should not bring the legal profession
into disrepute nor place the lawyer in a position where he may be
unduly tempted to place his own interests before the interests of
his client.
I.
The provision granting plaintiff "complete
and unfettered control" over settlement
negotiations is unenforceable.
In
purports

the
to

contingent
give

fee

himself

agreement
"complete

prepared
and

unfettered

over . . . settlement" of the Homeowners1 case. 1
x

by plaintiff,

he

control

R. 1006.

When a lawyer takes for himself "complete and unfettered
control over . . . settlement," as plaintiff purported to do in
this case, he attempts to strip the client of all control over his
case. Were this permitted, the lawyer's interest in the case would
rise to the point that he would have a proprietary interest in the
case in violation of Rule 1.8(j), Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct (formerly DR 5-103(A)). This is particularly so where, as
here, the contingent fee arrangement is the equivalent of a 60%
contingency.
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It has long been universally recognized that such provisions
purporting to preclude the client from settling his case without
the

consent

of

his

attorney

therefore unenforceable.

are

against

public

policy,

and

Maulding v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 168

F.2d 880f 882 (7th Cir. 1948); Calvert v. Stonerf 33 Cal.2d 97, 199
P.2d 297 (1948); 7 Am. Jur.2d Attorney at Law § 149 (1963).
accordance

with

responsibility

this

rule

require

that

of

law,

the

the

"lawyer

rules

of

In

professional

. . ,. abide

by

[his]

clientfs decisions concerning the objectives of representation" and
"whether to accept an offer of settlement."
Rules of Professional Responsibility (1988).

Rule 1.2(a), Utah
Though plaintiff does

not appear to seriously dispute this rule (R. 1314), it bears some
discussion to put the issues presented in their proper context.
The client is the principal and owner of the claim and the
attorney is his agent and fiduciary who prosecutes the claim under
the client's direction.

Their respective roles, responsibilities

and rights should remain the same whether the attorney is paid by
the

hour

or

argues

to

a

contingent

fee.

A

contingent

fee

arrangement, however, introduces the potential for conflict because
the attorney has an interest in the outcome of the case,,

This

conflict gives rise to the temptation, not present under hourly fee
arrangements, for the attorney

to attempt

to control the case,

particularly its settlement, to maximize his fee in relation to his
labor, regardless of the wishes of or the effect on his client.
attorney

yielding

litigation

either

to

this temptation

directly,

by

an
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may

express

seek

to control

prohibition

An
the

on his

clientfs

right

penalizing

to settle without

his consent, or indirectly, by

the client by imposing a higher fee in the event the

client settles against his attorney's wishes.
In

those

temptation,

instances

the

courts

where
have

the
always

attorney
refused

has
to

yielded
enforce

to
the

restriction on settlement to preserve the client's exclusive right
to control his case.

The rule is aptly stated in Giles v. Russell,

222 Kan. 629, 567 P.2d 845, 850 (1977):
It is generally recognized that . . . the client has
exclusive control over the subject matter of litigation
[citation omitted]. For this reason, the client may, in
good faith, settle or compromise his litigation or claims
with the opposing party at any stage of the suit without
the knowledge or consent of the attorney, and such
settlements are favored by the law where they are
honestly made for the simple purpose of ending the
litigation with no intention of taking advantage of the
attorneys [citation omitted]. Neither a valid contingent
fee contract nor an attorney's lien can interfere with a
client's
right
to settle
(citation omitted).
An
employment
contract which prevents the client from
settling without the consent of the attorney is void as
against public policy
[citation omitted],
(emphasis
added).
The balance has thus been struck decidedly in the client's favor.
The only limitation on the client's right to settle being that the
client

act

litigation.2

in good
I_d.

faith

for

the simple purpose of ending

the

As a practical matter, the balance must be drawn

so.
The attorney and client are in very different positions when
it comes to evaluating the settlement.

In the usual contingent fee

^The plaintiff has never contended that the Homeowners acted
otherwise than in good faith nor, as discussed below, could he.
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case the lawyer's financial position and health (the client is
often a personal injury victim) places him in a better position
than

the

client

litigation.

to

stand

the

risksf

stress

and

delays

of

While the case is the client's one and only, it is

only one of many cases the lawyer is handling.

The lawyer is as a

result in a much better position to play the odds and is more
likely than the client to be willing to reject a settlement offer
in the hope of a greater recovery.

Whil*; the client is concerned

about the total recovery, the lawyer is more concerned about the
relationship between the amount of the contingent fee and the labor
required

to produce

it.

The lawyer's differing

interests may

consciously or unconsciously impair his objectivity.

Requiring the

attorney to accept the client's good faith decision is the only
acceptable way to minimize the potential

for conflict

that is

consistent with the nature of the attorney/client relationship and
the client's absolute right to control his case.-3
II.
Plaintiff should not be permitted to profit
by his attempt to unlawfully restrict the
Homeowners' right to settle their own case.
Plaintiff's arguments in support of his claim for money in
addition to the contingent fee are characterized by the mechanical
application of the black letter rules he would have applied.
arguments

His

ignore the significant public policies that make the

wooden application of these rules inappropriate.
3

The risk that the client may in good faith desire to settle
on terms unsatisfactory to the lawyer is a risk the lawyer must
take if he desires to accept a case on a contingent fee basis.
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Blind adherence to legal rules is not a virtue and is totally
at

odds

with

the

judicial

function.

Columbia

Hoohuli, 50 Haw. 212, 437 P.2d 99, 104 (1968).
result
Id.

from,

rather

than

be

a

substitute

Casualty

Co. v.

"Legal rules should

for

legal

analysis."

The mechanical application of rules generally applicable to

contracts

is

agreements.

inappropriate

in

the

context

of

attorney's

Fee agreements between attorneys and clients

fees
"as a

matter of public policy are of special interests and concern to the
courts.

They

are not always enforceable

ordinary

commercial

contracts."

in the same manner as

Estate of Bradley,

128 Misc.2d

240, 490 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (N.Y. Sur. 1985).
In view of the lawyer's fiduciary relationship with the client
and his superior knowledge of the law and its workings, it is not
surprising that the courts have held that where an attorney drafts
a

fee

agreement

containing

an

unlawful

and

unenforceable

restriction on the client's right to settle, as here, the attorney
will not be permitted to benefit by reason of the illegality of the
restriction.

The general rule is that:

[Wjhere an attorney is employed on a contingent fee
consisting of a percentage of the amount recovered, and
the client compromises the case, the amount for which the
case is settled is the basis on which the attorney's
percentage is to be computed [citations omitted] . . . .
40 A.L.R. 1529, 1530

(1926);

see also 3 A.L.R. 472

(1919).

In

achieving the object of this general rule, that is preventing the
attorney

from benefiting

from his

have taken various approaches.
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illegal agreement,

the courts

Some courts have held that when a client fails to adhere to a
provision restricting the client's right to settle, the provision
is so offensive that it cannot be said the client has breached the
contract; therefore, the contract remains binding upon the parties
according

to its terms, with the exception* of course, of the

offending provision.
Lefkowitz

v.

This is the position taken by the court in

Leblang,

187 N.Y.S.

520

fApp. Term.

19«2I|«

In

Lefkowitz an attorney was employed under a one-third contingent fee
contract.

When the client settled the case for an amount that

would cause the attorney to lose money, the attorney claimed that
the client's unauthorized settlement violated the fee agreement,
thereby entitling the attorney to be paid the reasonable value of
his services.

The court rejected the attorney's claim noting that

"it is well established ^that a settlement by the clieiot without
the attorney's consent is not a breach of the agreement of retainer
[citations omitted] and the plaintiff is therefore entitled only to
a recovery of one-third of the amount of such settlement.'*

Id. at

521 (quoting In re Winkler, 154 A.D. 532, 139 N.Y*S. 755 J1913)).
Other

courts

have

severed

the

provision

restricting

the

client's right to settle, declaring it void, and have then applied
the remaining provisions of the contingent fee agreements

Calvert

v. Stoner, 33 Cal.2d 97, 199 P-2d 297 (1948); Newport Rolling Mill
Co. v. Hall, 147 Ky. 598, 144 S.W. 760, at 763

(1912)).

The

rationale for this approach is that the void provision stould not
taint the entire contract because the clause does not directly
concern the mutual consideration offered by the parties.
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IcL

In

other

words,

the

express

agreement

not

to

settle

without

the

attorney's consent is collateral to plaintiff's promise to work and
the defendant's promise
Therefore

the

enforceable/

to surrender

compensation

though

the

a portion of the recovery.

features

restriction

on

of

the

settlement

contract

are

is not.

The

court in Newport applied this approach when considering a contract
very similar

to the fee arrangement

in this case.

After having

determined that the provision limiting the right of settlement was
void as against public policy, the court said:
We are disposed to the view that this contract may be
treated as a severable onef and that the objectionable
clause may be stricken from it without affecting the
validity of the remainder of the contract. The clause in
question does not particularly concern the consideration
specified in the contract; and it is generally in
reference
to
contracts
in which
a part
of
the
consideration is illegal that the courts have ruled that
the entire contract was tainted. 144 S.W. at 763.
However, where severing the offending provision and allowing
recovery of the contingent percentage would permit

the lawyer to

recover more than he would have been entitled to receive on the
basis of quantum meruit, the entire agreement
void.
442

had been declared

For example, in Cummings v. Patterson, 59 Tenn. App. 536,
S.W.2d

agreement

640

(1968),

containing

the

court

a provision

declared

restricting

a

contingent

settlement

fee

entirely

void, rejecting the attorney's claim that the offending provision
should be severed and the contingent percentage be allowed.

The

court limited the attorney's recovery to the reasonable value of
the service rendered, which was $40,000, instead of permitting the
attorney to recover the $100,000 contingent fee.
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In rejecting the attorney's claim for the greater fee, the
court noted

that

if

the attorney were permitted

to recover a

greater fee, "parties will be at liberty to continue the use of
this or

similar provisions

[restricting

the client's

right to

settle] without any risk whatever, and they may be used to impede
or prevent the settlement of disputes.

A continuance of a practice

which we condemn as against public policy will be permitted, if not
invited.

The maintenance of sound rules of public policy can only

be effected through

penalizing those who violate them."

^Id. at

642 (quoting Butler v. Young, 121 W.Va. 176, 2 S.E.2d 250' (1939).
See also Mattionif Mattioni & Mattioni, Ltd. v. Ecological Shipping
Corp., 530 F.Supp.. 910, 915 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (severance denied where
the

contingent

fee

presumably

would

have

exceeded

the

fee

calculated on the basis of quantum meruit since the attorneys
sought a fee based on the contingent percentage and the client
sought to have the fee "limited" to a recovery in quantum meruit);
Davis v. Webber, 66 Ark. 190, 49 S.W. 822 (1899) (attorney seeking
a contingent fee of $2,885.50 was allowed onr

$1,000).4

Thus, while the foregoing cases take differing approaches in
differing circumstances, they all agree in a number of significant
respects.

First, any restriction on a client's right to settle is

unenforceable, and second, a lawyer will not be permitted to gain
anything

by

reason

of

having

attempted

4

to

impose

such

a

The Cummings, Mattioni, and Davis cases discussed here
comprise the authority primarily relied upon by plaintiff in
support of his claim that he is entitled to recover more than the
contingent fee on the basis of quantum meruit.
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restriction.
paramount,

Finally they all make the client's right to settle
encourage

settlement,

and

discourage

the

use

of

provisions restricting settlement thereby minimizing conflicts and
preventing clients from being overreached by their lawyers.
III.
Having acted unreasonably in refusing to approve
the settlement, the plaintiff should not as a
result be permitted to increase his fee.
In his letter to the Homeowners less than two weeks before he
filed suit against the Homeownersf plaintiff tells why he wants
more money:
In my letter of March 4, 1980, I reluctantly agreed
to your proposal of a contingent fee.5 However, a clear
condition of that agreement was that I would control the
settlement negotiations.
Since you have now breached
that condition, it is my opinion that we must revert back
to the hourly fee.
I think that is especially appropriate in view of
the reason for your settlement. In our last discussion,
it was very clear that you were settling on the reduced
basis because some or all of the parties did not wish to
go through the stress of a trial. In fact, I heard the
comment that someone would rather pay $1,000.00 out of
his own pocket, than go through another trial.
I am
certainly sympathetic with those feelings. However, it
is not appropriate to have my contingent fee reduced
because the client does not want to go through with the
trial.
For the foregoing reasons, I am submitting my bill
based upon an hourly basis. If you do not agree, you
should contact an outside attorney to consult with you in
this matter.
R. 1011-1012, (footnote and emphasis added).
5

In evaluating plaintiff's characterization of his reluctance
to agree to the contingent fee agreement, one must keep in mind
that at the time he proposed the contingent fee agreement,
plaintiff considered it the equivalent of a 60% contingent fee
agreement. R. 1006.
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In shortf the plaintiff claims that by settling the case for
$61,000

rather

unfairly

reduced

undisputed
refused

than

proceeding

the

plaintiff's

facts known

to

consent

to

trialf
fee.

the Homeowners
But, based

to the plaintiff prior

to

settlement, plaintiff

upon

have
the

to the time he
knew, and

indeed

acknowledged, that if the case were tried the maximum fee he could
recover would be at best substantially less than that he would
receive if the case were settled.
A. The Homeowners1 settlement for $61,000 was reasonable and
in good faith.
Given
settlement

the

risks

($61,000)

inherent
in

in

relation

recovery after a successful trial

any
to

suit, the
the

size

potentially

of

the

maximum

($93,000) is alone enough to

establish the reasonableness of the Homeowners1 settlement.

But

the specific circumstances of this case make the reasonableness of
the Homeowners1 settlement beyond dispute.
At the time of the settlement the Homeowners were a few weeks
from

a

R. 1635.

second

trial

on

their

claims

against

the developers.

At the end of the first trial all of the Homeowners1

claims had been dismissed, requiring an appeal with the attendant
delay.

R. 1018.

Given the Homeowners' experience with the first

trial they were understandably apprehensive.

With the second trial

fast approaching the developers had rejected the Homeowners' offer,
made with plaintiff's approval, to settle for $75,000 and had
counteroffered

to

settle

for

$47,000.

The highest

offer

the

developers had made before going ahead with the first trial was
$45,000.

R. 1635.

In addition, plaintiff had told the Homeowners
-24-

that he estimated there was a 75% chance of recovering somewhere
between $50,000 and $80,000 at trial.

R. 1634.

The Homeowners

were also placed in the disconcerting position of having to use
substitute counsel to try the case since plaintiff would be on
vacation during the trial.

R. 1014.

No doubt, the loss of the

services of one so familiar with the case and applicable law,
plaintiff having tried and appealed from the first trial, was a
concern of the Homeowners.

R. 192.

Furthermore, because the

corporate entity that developed the condominiums was insolvent, the
Homeowners would have had to succeed on their claim to pierce the
corporate veil to reach the assets of the individual developers if
any recovery was to be had.

R. 307.

The reasonableness and good

faith of the Homeowners1 settlement is thus readily apparent.
it was, the

settlement was

in the plaintiff's

As

best interest,

notwithstanding his claims otherwise.
B. Plaintiff's fee was not reduced as a
Homeowners' settlement of their case for $61,000.

result

of the

Plaintiff's net fee under the
Homeowners' settlement - $15,250.
Under the contingent fee agreement, plaintiff was to receive
30% of any recovery, in addition to retaining all fees paid before
the fee agreement was changed from an hourly to a contingent fee
agreement.

R. 1006.

Thirty percent of the $61,000 settlement is

$18,300.6

Plaintiff

refused

the Homeowners' offer

to pay the

Plaintiff's net fee under the settlement would apparently
have been $15,250 because $3,050 of the fee was due the attorney
who would actually try the case.
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contingent fee and instead chose to sue for a "larger fee."
Plaintiff's maximum fee if
the case were tried - $9,295.45.
The evidence introduced by plaintiff at the first trial on the
Homeowners' claims remanded for a second trial showed a maximum
possible

damage

claim

on

the

remanded

claims

of

$92,954.47.

R. 307. Under the fee arrangement with the substitute attorney who
would try the case, plaintiff weald receive 10% of any verdict as
his share of the fee, while substitute counsel would receive 20% of
any verdict as payment

for the work required to try the case.

Thereforef even if the Homeowners won on every issue at the second
trial, the most that plaintiff could hope to receive as a fee would
have

been

$9,295.45, 10% of

$92,954.47.

Plaintiff

expressly

recognized this in a letter to the Homeowners sometime prior to his
refusal to approve the $61,000 settlement when he wrote:
The arrangement [with substitute counsel] would cost
you no more because I would pay [substitute counsel] out
of my contingent fee. I would plan to pay him a fee of
20% (you pay me 30%). In fact, this is a major financial
sacrifice on my part as it would leave me with perhaps
$10,000 for three years work.
R. 1014.
Thus,

at

the

very

time

plaintiff

Homeowners with a claim for a higher

was

threatening

the

fee than agreed if they

refused to go to trial and settled the case, plaintiff knew that he
would certainly receive a higher fee if the case were settled at
that time than if he had to pay substitute counsel to try the case.
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Plaintiff's maximum fee if the case were
settled at the figure approved by him - $15,000,00.
Plaintiff knew when he approved the offer to settle with the
developers for $75,000, that $75,000 would become the ceiling above
which the developers would not go to settle the case.
acknowledges

in

an

affidavit

that

it

was

Plaintiff

his experience

(in

accordance with experience generally) that defendant's "settlement
offers are virtually

never

revoked11 and

offers increase as trial approaches.

that their

R. 1664.

settlement

Similarly, he must

have known that plaintiff's offers are likewise virtually never
revoked and that they go down as trial approaches.
nature of the negotiation process.
negotiations
negotiation

before

the first

invariably

Given the history of settlement

trial and

follow,

Such is the

the

best

the course
that

settlement

plaintiff

could

realistically have been expected, would have been a counteroffer
and settlement at some amount less than $75,000.
Plaintiff did not expect the developers1 highest settlement
offer until the eve of the second trial, as had been the case
before the first trial.

R. 1664-1665.

But in the unlikely event

the offer he expected before trial was as high as the previously
rejected $75,000, plaintiff's fee would only have been $15,000. If
the case were settled for $75,000 after trial began plaintiff's fee
would

have

division of

been

$7,500.

The

following

the fee between plaintiff

table

and

summarizes

the

substitute counsel,

pursuant to their agreement, with settlement at $75,000 at various
times before and after the trial began in mid-July:
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Settlement
Amount
$75,000
75,000
75,000

Settlement
Date

Plaintiff's
Fee

Substitute
Counsel's
Fee

June 1983
July 1 - Mid-July
Mid-July on

$18,750
15,000
7,500

$ 3,750
7,500
15,000

Time was working against plaintiff.

Holding out for a higher

settlement offer as plaintiff claims was his desire (R. 1665-1666)
would have reduced, not increased, his fee.

It was sheer fancy to

hope for a settlement offer in excess of the once rejected $75,000.
C. Based on plaintiff's own evaluation of the risks involved,
the settlement value of the case was less than $61,000.
Prior to the second trial on the Homeowners' claims plaintiff
estimated that there was a 75% chance of recovering between $50,000
and $80,000 at trial and a 50% chance of recovering between $80,000
and $100,000.7

R. 1634. Under plaintiff's evaluation, if the case

were tried 100 times, in 75 of the trials the verdict would be in
the range between $50,000 and $80,000.
verdict would

be either

In the other 25 trials the

above $80,000 or below $50,000.

The

maximum recovery at trial was limited to approximately $93,000 and
the minimum, of course, to 0.

R. 307.

Presumably, the values of

the highest and lowest ends of the possible recovery cancel each
other.

Based on plaintiff's estimate, the expected settlement

value of the case would then be between $37,500 and $60,000.**

'If punitive damages were
a 25% chance of a recovery in
had dismissed the Homeowners'
estimate was not relevant. R.

allowed, he estimated that there was
excess of $100,000. The trial court
claim for punitive damages so this
1634.

8

This range is arrived at by multiplying the chance of
recovery (75%) times the possible range of recovery ($50,000 to
$80,000) .
-OQ-

The progress and results of the settlement negotiations show
that the developers placed a similar evaluation on the Homeowners1
case.

R. 1635.

The undisputed

facts

show

that

no one could

conclude

that

plaintiff's contingent fee was reduced by the Homeowners' agreement
to settle their case for $61,000.

Indeed, one must conclude that

it was to plaintiff's financial advantage to have the case settled
at

that

figure,

at

that

time.

Surely

then, plaintiff

is not

entitled to receive more money because the Homeowners settled the
case without his consent, even if they did so in violation of a
restriction on settlement as plaintiff contends.9

To permit such a

result under any theory, even the most technical or "creative" the
plaintiff can muster, would be unjust and contrary to the interests
of not only the clients, but of lawyers as well, as it would bring
the already beleaguered legal profession into disrepute.
Since the plaintiff's fee was not reduced by the settlement,
why

this

lawsuit?

All

things

considered,

one

must,

however

reluctantly, conclude that the purpose of the suit was either to
punish

the

restriction

Homeowners,
on

settlement

for
or

their
to

alleged

extort

a

"breach"

higher

fee

of

the

from

the

Homeowners, or both.

y

As discussed below, because of plaintiff's purpose for
including the restriction, the Homeowners' settlement was not in
breach of the restriction.
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D. Plaintiff's suit is an attempt
unconscionable advantage of the Homeowners.

to

punish

or

take

When the Homeowners settled the prior case over plaintiff's
objection and notwithstanding his threats that he would insist on a
higher fee, he sued immediately for a fee substantially more than
half

again

agreement.

as

much

as

he

was

due

under

the

contingent

fee

He knew at the time that he stood to gain nothing by

seeing the prior case through to trial, and perhaps of even more
significance, he knew the Homeowners were tired from the stress of
nearly

five

years

of

litigation

financially to litigate with him.10

and

were

not

in a position

R. 1005, 1011, 1637.

Under

these circumstances, the plaintiff's suit seems nothing less than
an attempt to extort a higher attorney's fee through litigation,
from a group of people who were sick and tired of the stress and
expense

of

litigation,

all

apparently

because

plaintiff

was

unhappy, either because he lost the gamble he knowingly took when
he agreed to represent the Homeowners on a contingent fee basis or
because the Homeowners had not followed his direction as he felt
was required by the terms of the fee agreement.11

lu

Plaintiff was able to
litigate the fee dispute at
Homeowners would have to pay
battle of attrition like that
hand.

use attorneys on his own staff to
a cost substantially less than the
attorneys to represent them.
In a
waged by plaintiff he had the upper

iX

Plaintiff recognized that the contingent fee agreement was a
gamble in the March 4, 1980 contingent fee proposal when he wrote
"before you settle on a contingent fee, remember that it is a
gamble." (R. 1005-1007)
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Were

there

any

doubts

regarding

plaintiff's

motivation

in

bringing this suit, they are dispelled by the way the plaintiff has
pursued the litigation of this claim.

All that has ever been at

dispute regarding plaintiff's fee has been $13,000, the difference
between

the

amount

of

the

contingent

fee

the

Homeowners

willing to pay and additional fees the plaintiff demanded.

were

Though

only $13,000 has been at stake, plaintiff has litigated this case
in a fashion which would not be warranted if ten times that amount
were at risk.
He has made every possible effort to expand the litigation to
include parties with no real interest in the fee dispute.
brought
prior

in the
suit

He first

individual developers who were defendants

on

the

theory

that

they

had

interfered

in the

with

his

attorneyfs lien on the settlement proceeds and conspired to deprive
him of his fee.
&

Martineau,

R. 261, 446.
the

litigation, on

He then brought in Snow, Christensen

attorneys

for

the

the same theories of

developers

in

interference

and

the

prior

conspiracy

(R. 546), followed by adding one of the Homeowners, John Webster,
as a defendant on the conspiracy theory.

R. 562.

These defendants

were all eventually dismissed from the case on Summary Judgment and
no appeal has been pursued.

R. 1272, 1277.

He then brought in

Commercial Security Bank since settlement proceeds had been placed
in a segregated
case.

account

at

that

R. 841, 845, 929-933.

bank pending

resolution

of the

And finally, he even attempted to

join the Homeowners' present attorneys as defendants because their
fees had been paid with some of the settlement proceeds in excess
of the amount claimed by plaintiff.
-31-

R. 908, 1036.

Plaintiff

has

filed

numerous motions

relating

to the fee

dispute, including three motions made in an attempt to reargue the
court's order granting partial summary judgment to the Homeowners,
the last a motion to vacate on the grounds that the Homeowners had
fraudulently

induced

plaintiff

to

enter

the

contingent

fee

agreement, which, as described below, had neither legal nor factual
basis.

R. 1232, 1391, 1534.

He has attempted to prevent the

Homeowners from using the proceeds of the settlement, even those
amounts

in excess of that claimed

in his complaint.

R. 841.

Plaintiff has even gone so far as to claim damage as a result of
the loss of negotiating leverage he would have had he been able to
control the settlement proceeds.

R. 1169.

As a result, the pleading files have ballooned, the attorneys'
fees necessarily incurred by the Homeowners are more than a case
this size would warrant, and the trial court had to spend an
inordinate

amount

of

its

time

on

this

case.

Under

these

circumstances, plaintiff's fee should not be permitted to exceed
the

30%

contingent

fee

as

agreed

and,

as

discussed

below,

appropriate sanctions should be imposed against plaintiff to deter
further such conduct.
IV.
The fee agreement is not subject to the
interpretation suggested by plaintiff.
A. The fee agreement must be interpreted objectively, with
all ambiguities resolved against the plaintiff as a fiduciary and
the drafter of the agreement.
Plaintiff relies heavily on his interpretation of the language
of the fee agreement.

So though the resolution of this case turns
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on larger principles of public policy which require that the matter
be decided against the plaintiff regardless of the interpretation
placed on the contract language, it is still appropriate to address
the contract language itself.

The language of the contract must be

interpreted

course,

objectively,

subjective

intent

of

of

the

parties,

without
and

any

reference

to

the

ambiguities

in

the

agreement must be construed against the plaintiff since he drafted
the agreement.
1982).

It

agreement

is

Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-1108 (Utah
especially

be interpreted

appropriate

against

in

this

the plaintiff

case

that

the

since he was the

Homeowners1 trusted fiduciary.
Plaintiff construes the contingent fee agreement to prohibit
the Homeowners from accepting a settlement without his consent, and
as providing in the alternative for a higher alternative fee based
on

his

hourly

contingent

rate,

percentage,

rather
in

the

than

a

event

fee
of

based

on

settlement

the

agreed

without

his

consent.

The language of the agreement, interpreted objectively,

with

ambiguities

all

construed.

resolved

against

plaintiff,

cannot

be

The relevant contract language is as follows:

. . . I [plaintiff] suspect that a reasonable contingent
fee for this type of case would be 60% of any recovery.
Of course, we are about one-half way through the
litigation process. Thus, a reasonable contingent fee to
press the case from this point on would be 30% of any
recovery.
If you wish, I would finish the case on that
basis (i.e., 30% of any recovery). . . . However, before
you settle on a contingent fee, remember that it is a
gamble. If we go through another 100-200 hours, and lose
the case, you obviously win the gamble.
However, we
might just as well enter into some settlement next week
in which you lose the gamble.
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so

One further matter on contingent fees. Clients are
sometimes overly optimistic because they are not paying
anything to their attorney.
Thus they may turn down
reasonable settlement offers because it costs them
nothing to gamble on the results of a trial. Therefore,
I would accept the contingent fee only if I had complete
and unfettered control over any settlement.
If the contingent fee proposed is for any reason
unworkable, I would continue to work on an hourly basis.
R. 1006 (emphasis original).
B. The Homeowners' settlement of the case to avoid trial was
not a breach of the fee agreement.
The plaintiff's reason for reserving control over settlement
and the relationship between that reason and the reservation are
very explicitly stated.
from

"overly

The reason being to protect the plaintiff

optimistic"

clients

who

"turn

down

reasonable

settlement offers because it costs them nothing to gamble on the
results

of

the

trial,"

and

"[t]herefore"

plaintiff

"complete and unfettered control over any settlement."

required
R. 1006.

The reasons for the restriction on settlement and the restriction
itself are so firmly bound together by the language, the latter
following directly

from the former, that one must conclude the

restriction to be limited to those situations where it serves the
purposes expressed.

Any claim that the reasons for the restriction

are given were merely by way of example is not borne out by the
language.

And even if one could find ambiguity because of the

perceived differences in scope between the reasons given and the
restriction

imposed

when

considered

separately,

rather

than in

reference to each other as they should be, the ambiguity must be
resolved against the plaintiff as drafter and fiduciary.
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Accordingly,

the language must

restriction on the homeowners1
where a settlement

offer

be interpreted

to limit

the

right to settle to those instances

which plaintiff

thought

reasonable was

rejected by the Homeowners/ with the result that plaintiff would
have to proceed with trial.
should have so stated.
the

restriction

on

If more was intended by plaintiff/ he

So construed there has been no breach of

settlement/

since

the Homeowners

accepted

a

settlement offer and thereby avoid expense of trial.
C. The fee agreement cannot be interpreted as providing in
the alternative for attorney fees at an hourly rate.
The language of the fee agreement
does not provide for an alternative fee.
Plaintiff
the

event

interprets

the

the fee agreement as providing that in

Homeowners'

breached

the

agreement

by

settling

without plaintiff's consent/ his fee is to be determined based on
an

hourly

sentence
contingent

rate.
taken
fee

Plaintiff's
out

of

proposed

interpretation

context

reading

is

any

for

continue to work on an hourly basis."

as

reason

relies

on

follows:
unworkable/

R. 1006.

the

one

"If

the

I would

Read in context/

this sentence obviously means no more than that if the Homeowners
did not agree to accept the contingent fee agreement

"proposed/"

plaintiff would "continue" to work at his hourly rate as provided
in the then existing

fee agreement.

more into this language.

It is unreasonable to read

Again# if there is any ambiguity in the

language used/ it must be resolved against the plaintiff.
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When drafted, plaintiff never considered the
agreement as providing for an alternative fee.
Moreover, plaintiff's claim that he intended that the language
of the fee agreement provide for an alternative fee calculated on
an hourly basis is belied by his conduct following settlement.
Plaintiff's correspondence with the Homeowners at the time the fee
dispute arose negates any intention of relying any language in the
fee agreement as a basis for his claim that as a result of the
settlement his fee should be calculated at an hourly rate.
Plaintiff's first letter to the Homeowners regarding the fee
dispute does not assert that the language of the agreement provided
for an alternative fee agreement, though it specifically refers to
other language in the fee agreement.

R. 1009-1010.

In his next

letter to the Homeowners, plaintiff refers to the language of the
settlement agreement restricting the Homeowners' right to settle,
but states merely that it is his "opinion that we must revert back
to the hourly fee."

R. 1011-1012 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff's

failure to rely on the language of the fee agreement to support his
"opinion" is telling indeed.
that

the fee agreement

Had plaintiff believed at that time

provided

in the alternative

for a fee

computed at an hourly rate, being the experienced lawyer he is, one
would certainly have expected him to have said so in this letter.
Similarly,

there

is

no

reliance

on

the

language

of

the fee

agreement or mention of an alternative fee agreement in plaintiff's
early

answers

interrogatories

to

interrogatories.

plaintiff

claims

that

In
it

was

his
the

answers

to

Homeowners'

assumption of control of settlement in breach of the "condition"
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that plaintiff be given control over settlement that, "as a matter
of contract law," caused the "automatic" reversion to a fee based
on

the

"original" hourly

basis.

R.

135-136.

In addition,

plaintiff's complaint and amended complaints have never alleged an
alternative fee agreement as the basis for his claim for more
money.
Plaintiff

first

asserted

that

the

language

of

the

fee

agreement provided for calculation of his fee on an alternative
basis in his memorandum in opposition to the Homeowners1 motion for
summary judgment on the fee issue filed three years after the fee
dispute arose.
that

the

R. 1321-1322.

fee

agreement

Significantly, plaintiff's assertion

provided

an

alternative

basis

for

calculation of his fee appears to coincide with his discovery of
the case of Ward v. Orsini, 243 N.Y. 123, 152 N.E. 696 (1926),
cited in his opposing memorandum below and in his opening brief
here in support of the proposition that alternative fee agreements
are enforceable.
further

R. 1326.

The timing of the assertion supports

the inappropriateness of plaintiff's

confirms

the

disingenuousness

of

the

interpretation and

interpretation

he

now

advances.
D. Alternative fee agreements are indirect restrictions on
the client's right to settle and are therefore enforceable.
But, even

if the language of the fee agreement could be

construed to provide in the alternative for a fee based on his
hourly rate as plaintiff now claims, such an agreement would be
void as against public policy, since it could be used as a penalty
or a means to indirectly force compliance with an otherwise illegal
-37-

and unenforceable restriction on settlement.

When an alternative

fee agreement provides for a retrospective change to an hourly fee
in

the

event

the client

breaches

the unlawful

restriction

on

settlement, it does not function to protect any legitimate interest
of the lawyer.
restriction.

Rather it becomes a means of enforcing the unlawful
Obviously the alternative fee will only be invoked

when it will yield a higher fee than the contingent percentage.

By

threatening a higher fee on an hourly basis, the "alternative fee"
becomes a weapon to force compliance with the unlawful restriction
on settlement.

Any claim that alternative fee agreements do not

restrict the client's right to settle ignores reality.

It is not a

simple matter of the fee being calculated one way if the lawyer
consents and another
obvious.

if he does not.

Were such agreement

The coercive effect is

enforceable

the client would in

effect be forced to purchase the privilege of exercising what is
his absolute right to settle his case in good faith.
Furthermore, alternative contingent fee/hourly rate agreements
place the lawyer in the position of choosing the method used to
calculate his fee by either approving or disapproving the proposed
settlement.

This introduces an additional conflict not otherwise

inherent in the contingent fet

agreement.

The lawyer would be

unduly tempted, consciously or unconsciously, to refuse to approve
a reasonable settlement offer to increase his fee where a change to
the hourly rate would have that effect.

This is so contrary to the

fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and the client, that such
agreements ought not be permitted for that reason alone.
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V.
There is no legal or factual basis for plaintiff's
claim that he was fraudulently induced to
enter the contingent fee agreement.
Plaintiff

expresses

outrage

at

having

been

induced

into

entering into what he considered to be the equivalent of a 60%
contingent fee agreement by what he claims is the trickery of the
Homeowners.

The Homeowners heartily dispute the claims that they

tricked plaintiff or fraudulently misrepresented the value of their
claims.
that

Indeed, it is doubtful that they, even collectively, are

clever.

But

whatever

plaintiff's

claims

may

be,

the

undisputed facts show that plaintiff's claim that he was defrauded
is disingenuous and there is no merit to his assertion that he is
entitled to set the contract aside on grounds of fraud.
A. Plaintiff's conduct over the last six years makes his
assertion that the alleged misrepresentations were material to him
so incredible that the assertion may be disregarded as a matter of
law.
After learning of the alleged misrepresentation in September
1980, the plaintiff continued to represent the Homeowners through a
trial and an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, and was ready to
represent them through another trial. R. 1583-1584, 1589-1590. In
spite

of

his

plaintiff's

assertion

misrepresentations were significant
expressed

by

him

in

his

that

the

alleged

to him and the outrage now

brief,

he

never

mentioned

the

misrepresentation to John Webster, plaintiff's liaison with the
Homeowners.

R.

1589-1590,

1584-1585.

Nor

did

he make any

reference to the misrepresentation in his October 1980 letter to
the

Homeowners

reporting

on

the
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results

of

the

first

trial

(R. 1589-1590); nor did he make any allegations of fraud in his
September 1983 complaint or any of the seven amended complaints
proposed in this action (R. 2, 264, 539, 553, 708, 834, 911, 1184);
nor did he raise any claim of fraud in any of the first three
hearings on the Homeowners1 motion for summary judgment on the fee
issue,

R. 1226, 1318, 1391.

Absolutely no mention of the alleged

fraud was made during the six years after plaintiff claims to have
discovered it. R. 1584-1585.
Given

plaintiff's

conduct,

his

claim

that

the

alleged

misrepresentations we e material to him is so unbelievable that it
may, as a matter of law, be disregarded.

A claim based on evidence

too incredible to be accepted by reasonable minds does not raise an
issue that would preclude the order of summary judgment in the
Homeowners' favor.

Gross v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 29

F.Supp. 1005 (S.D. Ohio 1939).

Similarly, a pretended issue, one

upon which no substantial evidence can be offered in support, is
not

a

genuine

issue

that

will

preclude

a

summary

judgment.

Southern Distributing Co., Inc. v. Southdown, Inc., 574 F.2d 824,
826 (5th Cir. 1978).
B. The only relevant alleged misrepresentation is a statement
of opinion or judgment which will not support a fraud claim.
Only those material misrepresentations alleged to have been
relied upon by plaintiff prior to the time of the contingent fee
agreement can be relevant here.
P.2d 273 (1952).

Pace v. Parrish, 122 Ut. 141, 247

Plaintiff claims two misrepresentations regarding

the value of the black substance claim.

The first is that the cost

of

problem

correcting

the

black

substance
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would

be

"very

substantial."

R. 1540.

The second is that the cost of correcting

the black substance problem would be $78,000.
The

only

representation

regarding

the

R. 1539.
value

of

the

black

substance claim upon which plaintiff can say he relied prior to
agreeing to the March 1980 contingent fee agreement is that "the
expenses for repairing the 'black substance1
substantial."12

R.

1540.

A

. . . would be very

representation

that

the

cost

of

repairing the black substance problem would be "very substantial,"
is a statement of opinion or judgment.

What is substantial to one

person may not seem substantial to another.
be

substantial

to

clients,

especially

Specifically, what may

retired

folks

on

fixed

incomes, may not be substantial to a lawyer used to dealing in very
large sums.

Even if the cost to repair the black substance problem

were nine or ten thousand dollars as plaintiff claims, that is a
"very substantial" sum.
A representation that the cost of repair would be substantial
cannot

be the basis for an allegation of fraudulent

inducement,

since a claim of fraud cannot be based on the mere expression of an
opinion or upon representations in regard to matters of estimate or
judgment.

Law

v.

Sidney,

47 Ariz. 1,

53 P.2d

64, 66

(1936).

Before a fraud claim is actionable:
The representation must relate to a past or present
matter of fact, . . . and must not be put forward simply
as
an
expression
of
opinion;
and
. . . [t]he
12

Plaintiff does not recall relying on the $78,000 figure at
any time prior to the time the contingent fee agreement was entered
in March 1980. R. 1540. A written estimate containing the $78,000
figure was not received until August 1980. R. 1544.
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circumstances must have been such as to justify the
defrauded party in relying on the representation, as a
basis of his own decision . . . .
Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Ut. 52f 75, 185 P.2d 264, 276 (1947)
(quoting Black, Rescission of Contracts at paragraph 68, p. 172).
There being no misrepresentation of fact in this case, there can be
no fraud upon which plaintiff can base a claim to set aside the
contingent fee agreement.
C. Plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations from
seeking relief based upon fraud discovered six years ago.
An action seeking relief based upon fraud must be commenced
within three years after the fraud is discovered or the claim is
barred by the statute of limitations.
Ann.

§ 78-12-26(3), Utah Code

An action is commenced by the filing of a complaint (Utah R.

Civ. P. 3(a)) and allegations of fraud in a complaint must be
stated with particularity.

Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b).

None of the plaintiff's five filed complaints or additional
three proposed complaints allege with particularity or otherwise
that he was fraudulently induced to enter the fee agreement.

The

allegation

the

in

plaintiff's

complaints,

as

explained

in

correspondence and elsewhere, relate solely to the Homeowners1 July
1983 settlement of the litigation with the developers.

R. 2, 264,

539, 553, 708, 834, 911, 1184.

Since six years have passed since

the

fraud

discovery

of

complaint alleging

the

alleged

without

the

filing

of a

fraud, the plaintiff is forever barred from

asserting any claim for relief based upon having been fraudulently
induced to enter the March 4, 1980 contingent fee agreement.
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D. By continuing to represent the Homeowners for three years
after discovering the alleged fraud, plaintiff has waived any
alleged right to set aside the agreement.
Where one has been fraudulently induced to enter a contract,
and after discovering the fraud, continues to perform the contract,
he is deemed to waive the claimed fraud.

Bezner v. Continental Dry

Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah 1976).
If a person claims that a contract or conveyance was
procured by fraud, he must elect to rescind promptly or
he will be barred relief upon the ground of having
ratified the transaction. If he proceeds to execute the
contract with knowledge that fraud has been perpetrated
on him, or continues to receive benefits under the
contract after he has become aware of the fraud, or if he
otherwise conducts himself with respect to it as though
it were a subsisting and binding engagement, he will be
deemed to have affirmed [the contract] and waived his
right to rescind.
Power v. Esarey, 37 Wash.2d 407, 224 P.2d 323, 326 (Wash. 1950)
(quoting 9 Am.Jur. Cancelation of Instruments § 46 (1937).
By

continuing

to

represent

the

Homeowners

in

the

prior

litigation for nearly three years after discovery of the alleged
fraud, by bringing an action against the Homeowners for breach of
the contingent fee agreement he now wishes to set aside, and by
failing to raise a claim of fraud for six years, plaintiff has
waived any right to set aside the contingent fee agreement that he
might otherwise assert.

Indeed, by his conduct, plaintiff has

unequivocally affirmed the contingent fee agreement and must abide
by the provision providing for payment of a 30% contingent fee as
set forth in this court's prior order.
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VI.
Mr. DeBry is not entitled to any interest
on his claim for attorney1s fee.
A.

DeBryfs conduct makes the award of interest inappropriate.

There are a number of familiar legal reasons why plaintiff
should not be permitted to recover any interest on the contingent
fee he refused to accept.
course,

the

foremost

While these will be discussed in due

reason

for

denying

the

recovery

of any

interest is peculiar to this case and cases like these.

Most

simply put/ plaintiff's conduct makes the recovery of interest
inappropriate.
The rule that the plaintiff should not be permitted to gain by
having unlawfully included a restriction on settlement is his fee
agreement should be applied to preclude the recovery of interest on
the contingent
accept.

fee which was offered

but which he refused to

Applying the rule to preclude the recovery of interest

furthers the policy of discouraging the use of such provisions, and
perhaps more importantly, discouraging the use of litigation to
intimidate clients or to penalize them for their supposed breach of
unenforceable restrictions on settlement.
It
interest

is

inappropriate

to

permit

plaintiff

to

recover

any

in this case because there was no rational basis for

plaintiff's

refusal

contingent fee.

to

approve

the

settlement

and

accept

the

As already discussed, plaintiff's contingent fee

under the settlement was higher than any fee he could have received
if the case were tried and was comparable or higher than any fee he
could have

received

in the unlikely event that the case were
-44-

settled

at

the

figure

approved

by

him

and

rejected

approve

the

settlement

by

the

developers.
Plaintiff's

refusal

to

was

never

warranted nor was his suit for $31f300 in attorney's fees.

There

was no ethical or economic basis for Mr. DeBry's refusal to consent
to the $61,000 settlement or for his disputing the fee owed.

This

litigation has cost his former clients thousands of dollars in
attorney's fees and considerable anxiety.

Consequently, plaintiff

should not be permitted to recover interest on the contingent fee
because to do so would reward him for conduct which should be
discouraged among lawyers.
B. DeBry's refusal to accept the contingent
recovery of any interest.

fee precludes

At the time the prior suit with the developers was settled,
Mr. Webster and other representatives of the Homeowners met with
plaintiff to discuss his demand for money in addition to the agreed
30% contingency fee.

At that time, Mr. Webster, on behalf of the

Homeowners,

to

offered

pay

plaintiff

$18,300

(30%

of

the

settlement) as provided by the fee agreement, plus any accrued
costs.

R. 1246-1247, 1636.

Plaintiff refused to accept this sum,

and sued for an additional $13,000. R. 1247, 1637.
"'Prejudgment

interest'

represents

an

amount

awarded

as

damages due to the opposing party's delay in tendering the amount
owing . . . ."

L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Construction Co.,

Inc., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980).

The rejection of an offer of

payment stops the running of interest.
P.2d 83, 87 at n. 9 (Utah 1983).

Utah County v. Brown, 672

Specifically, where, as here, an
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attorney refuses to accept payment of his attorney's fee, he is not
entitled to recover any interest for the time prior to the entry of
judgment.

Griffin v. McCarthy, 174 Wash. 74, 24 P.2d 595, 596

(1933), appeal dismissed and cert, denied, 291 U.S. 653 (1934).
As a matter of law the attorney's fee owed by the Homeowners
was at most 30% of the $61,000 settlement.

There being no basis in

law or fact for plaintiff's refusal to approve the settlement offer
or

for

insisting

additional

upon payment

$13,000,

of

plaintiff

the contingent

cannot

claim

the

fee plus an
Homeowners

insistence that he accept $18,300 as payment for his fees was not
justified.1^

Even if the tender was conditioned on plaintiff not

seeking any additional fees as plaintiff has claimed (R. 1394), it
was a condition that the Homeowners had a right to insist upon, and
so was not a condition that would make the offer to pay ineffective
as a tender.

Dull v. Dull, 138 Ariz. 357, 674 P.2d 911, 913 (Ct.

App. 1983) ("[a] tender is not conditional if the condition is one
which the person making

the tender . . . has a legal right to

insist upon11); accord, Plank v. Arban, 241 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1970); City of Newark v. Block 86, Lot 30, 94 N.J.
Super.

468,

228

A.2d

877

(N.J.

Super.

Ct.

Ch.

Div.

1967).

Moreover, where it is plain, as it is here, that the actual tender
of funds would be useless, the tender is not defective because
funds were not actually tendered.

Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d

1152, 1154 (Utah 1976), reversed on other grounds, 748 P.2d 1084,

See pp. 23 to 32, supra.
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1089 (1988).

Even the plaintiff admits that the Homeowners have

been willing to pay the plaintiff $18f300 from the outset of this
litigation.

R. 1412.

C. A lawyer cannot charge interest unless the client has so
agreed in advance.
The lawyer has an ethical duty to "reach a clear agreement
with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to be made" and
"should

explain

particular

fee

fully

to

arrangement

[the
he

client]

the

proposes."

reasons

EC

2-19f

for

the

Rules of

Professional Conduct of the Utah State Barr (1971) f superceded by
Rules of Professional Conduct effective 1988.14
Accordingly, it has been repeatedly held that a lawyer may not
charge interest on a client's account unless it is agreed to in
advance by the client.

E.g.f Informal Opinion 82-21, Connecticut

State Bar as reported in ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional
Conduct, 801:2058; Opinion 82-1, Ohio State Bar, as reported in
ABA/BNA
Opinion

Lawyers'

Manual

on

Professional

Conduct,

81-14, Arizona State Bar, as reported

801:6827;

in the ABA/BNA

Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, 801:1307; Opinion 1980-53,
California State Bar, as reported in ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on
Professional Conduct, 801:1601.
In Informal Decision C-741 (1964) the ABA Committee on Ethics
and Professional responsibility declared it improper to include a
14

Though Utah revised its Rules of Professional Responsibility
in 1988, the revised rules do not in any way reduce the ethical
obligations of lawyers nor do they make changes that would cause
one to conclude that the ethical considerations set forth in the
1971 version are no longer relevant as guides to ethical behavior.
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legend stating interest would be charged on past-due accounts on
the bills sent to clients.

The committee feared that "the claimed

accrual of interest on fees upon which the clients have not agreed,
either

in advance

or

upon

conclusion

of

the servicesf

[would

constitute] a bargaining weapon an attorney might use in reaching
agreement

as to the amount

Opinions 329 (1975)).

of the fees."

(1 Informal Ethics

The same rationale would preclude plaintiff

from recovering interest in this case.

Again, the public policies

associated with attorney's fee agreements justifies treating them
differently than other types of agreements.

Estate of Bradley, 128

Misc.2d 240, 490 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (N.Y. Sur. 1985).
VII.
Sanctions should be imposed on
plaintiff to deter him from using
the courts to discipline or harass clients.
This court has the power to impose sanctions for frivolous
appeals pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
pursuant

to

administration

its

inherent

of

justice.

power

to

Moreover,

impose
"when

sanctions

in

the

there has been a

deviation from proper professional standards there should be some
appropriate penalty, not only for the effect upon the attorney, but
for

the

public."

salute ~y measure

for

the benefit

of

the Bar and the

In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1978).

Appropriate

sanctions include the return of the attorney's fee paid by the
client.

Id.

Sanctions should be imposed upon plaintiff in this case on
each of the foregoing bases since there was never any justification
for

his

refusal

to

approve

the
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Homeowners'

settlement,

his

subsequent
plaintiff

suit or this appeal.
claims,

the

Rather than reducing his fee as

settlement

yielded

almost

double

what

he

could have expected after a successful trial because the cost to
plaintiff of trying the case was more than his fee could possibly
have been increased through trial.

In light of the way plaintiff

has multiplied the proceedings below and has used the system (and
his ability to use the system at lower cost than the Homeowners) to
punish

the Homeowners

for a supposed breach of an unenforceable

restriction on settlement, a stiff sanction is warranted.
sanction is imposed, plaintiff will in a sense have won.

If no
He will

be able to hold the result in this case out as a lesson to other
clients

that

seek

to

settle

without

his

consent.

The

prudent

client will in the future give plaintiff the fee demanded and save
himself

the anxiety

and

cost

of enforcing

his

right

to settle.

Sanctions must be imposed so that the result in this case will be a
lesson to lawyers, not a warning to clients.
It would be appropriate in this case to require plaintiff to
pay the costs of this appeal, including the Homeowners' attorney
fees and to pay back all or at least a substantial portion of the
attorney's fee which the Homeowners have paid to him.
CONCLUSION
Based

on

the

foregoing,

the

Homeowners

request

that

plaintiff's appeal be dismissed, that the court impose appropriate
sanctions on plaintiff for filing a meritless appeal, including an
award to the Homeowners of attorney's

fees, double costs, and a

refund of the attorney's fees paid plaintiff, and that the trial
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court's award of interest to plaintiff on his attorney's fee be
overruled.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of November, 1988.
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER

/A&r*M&

/\j/^/&t*sU<#:

L.R. GARDINER, JR.
THOMAS R. VUKSINICK
Attorneys for Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the foregoing Respondents' Brief was
served upon the appellants by mailing four true and correct copies
thereof this 21st day of November, 1988f to:
William F. Bannon
Robert J. DeBry
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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ADDENDUM
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Record Page
1003

Plaintiff's March 4, 1980 letter to Homeowners

1005-1007

Plaintiff's June 20, 1983 letter to Homeowners

1009-1010

Plaintiff's June 24, 1983 letter to Homeowners

1011-1012

Plaintiff's May 2, 1983 letter to Homeowners

1014

Affidavit of John Webster dated September 6, 1985

1016-1021

Affidavit of John Webster dated April 7, 1986

1245-1248

Plaintiff's October 9, 1980 letter to Homeowners

1589-1590

Affidavit of John Webster dated December 24, 1986

1631-1638

R. 1003

C/

(7

601 £76-4439

November 9, 1978

Mr. Ashby Badger, President
Graystone Pines Owner's Ass'n.
2710 Highland Drive, #4
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Mr. William Keyser
2710 Highland Drive, #10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Gentlemen:
This will confirm our arrangement that I will
immediately commence preliminary research and a drafting of
the complaint and interrogatories in the Graystone Pines
matter. In accordance with our understanding, I will charge
$50.00 per hour.
I am attaching herewith my initial bill of $400
for the work done to date. I understand that you will bring
in an initial retainer of $2500 in the near future. That
money will be deposited in our trust account. Thereafter,
you will receive periodic billings, and with each billing we
will automatically withdraw the appropriate amount.
We apparently agree that the strategy will be to
press defendants to enter into a favorable arbitration agreement. We can best accomplish that objective by hitting them
hard with a good, solid complaint and extensive interrogatories.
Thus, your first few billings will be relatively high.
I am attaching a copy of the letter to the defendants,
We are not waiting for their answer. Instead, we are pushing
ahead with our research and drafting of pleadings.
Sincerely yours.

Robert J. DeBry
RJD/ehh
Enclosures

,0*
vo
oc

R. 1005 - 1007

2040 £**/ 4S0CJ?*d, JL<6 20J- J&&JL(< €*/y,fyt*AS4JS7
601 27B-4439

March 4, 1980
Mr. Ashby Badger
2710 Highland Drive
Apartment 4
Salt Lake City, Utah

84106

Mr- Bill Kaiser
2710 Highland Drive
Apartment 10
Salt Lake City, Utah

84106

iMr. John Webster
2710 Highland Drive
Apartment 12
Salt Lake City, Utah

84106

Gentlemen
Re:

Graystone Pines

I appreciated the candid discussion we had about the cost of
the present litigation.
It is true that I initially underestimated the cost of the
litigation. For that, I apologize. However, it is extremely
difficutl to predict, in advance, the cost of litigation. Primarily,
that is because we cannot know in advance how obstreperous the
defense will be.
Also, in reviewing the file, it appears that I made that
estimate before I was aware that the corporation had been bankrupted
by Busch, Coulam and Jensen. Our effort to "pierce the corporate
veil" really doubles the expense and complexity of this litigation.
In a sense, that is water under the bridge. However, I think
it is fair for us all to take a lesson from that. I have estimated
that we are about7 one-half way through the expenses of this case.
If everything goes our way, the actual cost could be substantially
less. However, we may well buck up against unforeseen problems which
would increase that cost. I would like to give you a more trustworthy
figure, but I cannot; and I doubt if any other attorney can.

A #\4

nf\^

Page Two
March 4, 1980
I have considered* your request that I continue the case on
some sort of contingent fee. As I advised in the beginning, this
is not the type of case which lends itself easily to a contingent fee.
In part, that is because our original goal was simply to force the
defendants into arbitration.
Contingent fees generally run from 30-60% depending upon the
complexity of the case and other factors. The typical contingent
fee would be 33 1/3%; however, it is by no means uncommon to see
40-50-60% contingent fees.
I believe that few attorneys would tackle this case on a
contingent fee. If they did so, I would suspect that a reasonable
contingent fee for this type of case would be 60% of any recovery.
Of course, we are about one-half way through the litigatioji process.
Thus, a reasonable contingent fee to press the case from this point
on would be 30% of any recovery. If you wish, I would finish the
case on that basis (i.e., 30% of any recovery). You would, of course,
have the obligation to pay "out of pocket" expenses such as telephone,
photocopies, witness fees, depositions, research fees, experts, etc.
However, before you settle on a contingent fee, remember that it is
a gamble. If we go through another 100-200 hours and lose the case,
you obviously win the gamble. However, we might just as well enter
into some settlement next week in which case you lose the gamble.
One further matter on contingent fees. Clients are sometimes
overly optimistic because they are not paying anything to their
attorney. Thus, they may turn down reasonable settlement offers
because it costs them nothing to gamble on the results of a trial.
Therefore, I would accept the contingent fee only if I had complete
and unfettered control over any settlement.
If the contingent fee proposed is for any reason unworkable,
I would continue to work on an hourly basis. However, I would like
to point out one thing. When I accepted the case, I told you that
my regular fee for litigation was $70 per hour. However, I agreed
to take on the case for $50 per hour. Since that time I have" increased my regular fee for litigation to $90 per hour. I have not
raised my fee for this case—nor do I intend to do so. However, I
certainly cannot ^reduce my fee in any way.
There is one alternative which you should realistically consider.
You might find another attorney who could handle this matter for less
money. I would harbor no bad feelings about such an arrangement, and
I would cooperate with your new counsel in every way. Although few
lawyers will admit it, hiring a lawyer is much like hiring a gardner.
The client should shop around and find someone who will do an adequate
job at the lowest price.

«.«i.-AShby Badger

Mr.'Bill Kaiser
Mr- John Webster
Page Three
March 4, 1930
There is one final way in which you might hold the price down.
As far as possible, you can provide manpower to assist with the
necessary legwork. (I might add that you have been splendid about
these requests so far.) Whatever work you can do saves $50 per hour.
At the moment, I have one request pending. I have asked Bill
Kaiser to get two blown-up photos of the microscopic study compairing
Rockwool insulation and the "black substance".
I can now add further requests. I am attaching a written report
from Clawson which outlines what must be done (in his opinion) to
repair the roof. I would like you to get about five written bids
from reputable roofers (including Clawson) on the cost of the repairs
he has recommended. With each bid, get a written guarante.e (e.g.,
one year or ten years, etc.). Also, ask the roofer to bid on any
extra or alternate system which the builder might suggest to improve
Clawson1s plan. Have the roofer give a written guarantee on the
alternative.
Finally, I am going to need a scale model of the roof for the
trial. The model should measure about 4 1 X 8' and be portable enough
to carry into court. The model should be constructed in such detail
that our expert can point out where the leaks occur and why. Also,
the expert must show, on the model, why a whole new roof was necessary
to correct the problem. Perhaps the model could be constructed in
such a way that we could actually tear it down and show how the new
roof looks. We can also construct full-size models of any particular
part of the roof (e.g. corners, flashing, etc.) which contribute
to the problem.
Such models might cost $1,000 or so. However, that would be
the most important part of the trial. The jury should see why the
leaks occur. You could work with our expert to construct such models.
Such models are generally admissible in evidence so long as they
fairly and accurately depict the real roof. Thus, they should, so
far as possible, be scale models down to and including the same
materials.
Please advise me of your response tp^-ttrta foregoing.

Sincerely ,j

Robert J. DeBry
RJD:sg
Enc.

R. 1009 - 1010

a/c&

SOI 202-©013

HAND DELIVERED
6-20-83

June 20, 1983

Mr. Ashby Badger
2710 Highland Drive
Apartment 4
Salt Lake City, Utah

84106

Mr. Bill Kaiser
2710 Highland Drive
Apartment 10
Salt Lake City, Utah

84106

Mr. John Webster
2710 Highland Drive
Apartment 12
Salt Lake City, Utah

84106

Sentlemen:
I would like to review the events of last week.
John came by to ask my advice about making a 561,000
rounter offer. I vigorously recommended against that plan.
John apparently met with the group and received their authority
Lo go ahead againsf my advice. John then delivered the counter
>ffer without my knowledge or consent. I was informed after the
fact.
I have informed you that your conduct leaves me in an
lwkward position. I believe I would be perfectly justified in
withdrawing, and I told you that I would give my answer after the
weekend.
After due consideration I think the time before the
:rial is too short to accommodate a smooth transfer to a new
.awyer. Therefore, I will not withdraw from your case. The
\atter will be tried by my associate, Robert Hansen.
However, I must emphasize that you oust assume full
•esponsibility for going against my advice and assuming direct
control of the settlement negotiations. I am enclosing for your

M#Afc
shby Badger
ill Kaiser
ohn Webster
age Two
une 20, 1983

FOR

~sr«, nf our letter to you of March 4, 1980. You will
S i S thftPa eonoitionof t£e continent fee agreement va. that
:"h"ld have full control of .11 s e t t l e d negotiation..
Since

Robert J . DeBsy
*JD:sg
inc.

DING
411 1
2000

R. 1011 - 1012

@U<aJ.'!%*&dy vsLoc^te*
J^/tJU* &fy .fyuJL 8M/7
OOl 262-891?*

June 24, 1983

Mr. John Webster
2170 Highland Drive
Apartment No. 12
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Mr. Ashby Badger
2710 Highland Drive
Apartment No. 4
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Mr. Bil Kaiser
2710 Highland Drive
Apartment No. 10
Salt Lake City, Utah

84106

Gentlemen:
I have asked Mr. Roth and Mr. Wheeler to prepare the
settlement documents and forward them to me with a check. I
will notify you when those documents arrive.
In my letter of March 4, 1980, I reluctantly agreed to
your proposal of a contingent fee. However, a clear condition
of that agreement was that I would control the settlement
negotiations. Since you have now breached that condition, it is
my opinion that we must revert back to the hourly fee.
I think that is especially appropriate in view of the
reason for your settlement. In our last discussion, it was very
clear that you were settling on the reduced basis because some
or all of the parties did not wish to go through the stress of a
trial. In fact, I heard the comment that someone would rather
pay $1,000.00 out of his own pocket, than go through another
trial. I am certainly sympathetic with those feelings.
However, it is not appropriate to have my contingent fee reduced
because the client does not want to go through with the trial.

John Webster
Ashby Badger
Bill Kaiser
Page Two
June 24, 1983

For the foregoing reasons, I am submitting my bill
based upon an hourly basis. If you do not agree, you should
contact an outside attorney to ccnsult with you in this matter.
Sio£e^ely,

ROBERT J. DEBRY /

RJD/ck
Enclosure:

Statement

R. 1014

SOI 262-S913

May 2, 1983

JOHN WEBSTER
2710 Highland Drive, #12
Salt Lake City
Utah, 84106
Dear John:
Re:

Graystone Pines

As you know, the earliest trial date we could get
was July 5, 1983, That leaves me in a dilemma. On the one
hand, I have a family vacation scheduled for most of the mont.*
of July. On the other hand, I think your interest is best
served by getting an early trial.
We might solve that problem by inviting outside
counsel to try the case. That is a fairly common practice,
and I could assist in the preparation. That is also a fairly
common practice.
the matter ^ith Robert Hansen
He is receptive to the idt±zn He
Therefore, I recommend that you
approve this arrangement.
The arrangement would cost you no more because I
would pay Mr. Hansen out of my contingent fee. I would plan
to pay him a fee_oL 20%, (you pay me 30%) . In fact, this
is a mfljor^f-h^n^Tl sacrifice on mv paff as it vnnlri Ipavfi me
with perhaps $10#000 for 3 years of work. Nevertheless, I see
no other way to resolve the problem. If you agree, please
sign below.
Sincerely,

DATED this

'day of May, 1983.
t_^john Webster

R. 1016 -
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Randall S. Feil 1052
Thomas R. Vuksinick 3341
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN
57 West 200 South, Suite 400
American Plaza II
P.O. Box 3450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Intervenors
and Counter-Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION; ROBERT BUSCH;
RONALD COULAM; MELVIN
JENSEN; and the partnership
of SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU,
Defendants,
vs.

:
:
:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN WEBSTER

:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. C83-5167

:
:

JOHN WEBSTER, ROY NEILSON,
FLORENCE LEWON, CARLOS
CROFT and LOUISE MALLONEE
as the BOARD OF MANAGERS
OF THE GRAYSTONE PINES
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION on
behalf of the owners of all
the units in the Graystone
Pines Condominiums,
Intervenors and
Counter-Plaintiffs.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Judge Raymond S. Uno

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

John Webster, after having been first duly sworn,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

I

am

a

member

of

the

Graystone

Pines

Homeowners Association and am named as a defendant in the
above-entitled action.
2.

I have

personal

knowledge

of

the

events

relative to the prior lawsuit, Civil No. C79-763, ("prior
lawsuit")

brought

by

the

Graystone

Pines

Homeowners

Association on behalf of the Homeowners against Graystone
Pines,

Inc.,

and

("developers").

defendants

Busch,

Coulam

and

Jensen

At the time the prior lawsuit was tried and

through the time that suit was settled, and until April 11,
1985,

I

was

president

of

Graystone

Pines

Homeowners

Association.
3.

On or about November 9, 1978, the Association

hired the plaintiff, attorney Robert J. DeBry (hereinafter
"DeBry") to represent the Association in the prior lawsuit
the builders and developers of Graystone Pines Condominiums
(hereinafter

"developers").

The

Complaint

in the prior

lawsuit was filed in 1979.
4.
per

hour

for

DeBry was paid at an hourly rate of $50.00
the

time

spent

-2-

in prosecuting

the prior

lawsuit.

Between November 9, 1978, and March 4; 1980, the

Homeowners

paid

DeBry

at

least

$15,354.42

(exclusive

of

costs) for work performed on the homeowners' case.
5.
proposed

In March of 1980 a new compensation plan was

by DeBry, whereby DeBry would receive

30% of any

recovery achieved in our case; this amount to be in addition
to

the

fees

the

Association

had

already

paid.

The

Association agreed to DeBry's terms on March 27, 1980.
6.

The

first

trial

in

the

prior

lawsuit

was

begun on September 16, 1980 and continued for eleven days to
October lf 1980.

At the end of the trial, the trial court

dismissed all of the Homeowners1

claims except their claim

for damage to the condominiums caused by a black substance
(the "black substance" claim") which formed where the walls
met

the

floor

in

many

areas

of

the

three

buildings

comprising Graystone Pines Condominiums. Mr. DeBry, without
first consulting

with me or any member of the Homeowner's

Association and without my or the Homeowner's Association's
consent, then stipulated to dismissal of the black substance
claim with prejudice.

The Homeowners Association appealed

the

of

dismissal

substance

of

claim.

all
On

the

July

claims

20,

1982,

including
Utah

the

black

Supreme

Court

remanded for trial all of the dismissed claims, except the
black substance claim which

it refused

to reinstate.

The

reinstated

claims were set for trial

in about mid-July,

19837.

Some months before the second trial was to

begin Mr. DeBry requested that I enter direct negotiations
with the developers to see if a satisfactory
might be made.

settlement

DeBry told me that he believed that I was

better qualified to handle the negotiations than he. I kept
Mr.

DeBry

advised

of

the

progress

of

the

settlement

negotiations and he was made aware of each settlement offer
before

it was made.

Mr. DeBry

advised

me

on several

occasions that Gra ystone Homeowners Association was free to
accept any settlement offer with which it was comfortable.
8.

Prior to the second trial, Mr. DeBry and I

had a discussion regarding a likely recovery in the event it
was necessary to have a second trial.

He told me that there

was a 75% chance of recovering between $50,000 and $80f000,
50% chance of recovering between $80,000 and $100,000, a 25%
chance

of

recovering

between

punitive damages were allowed.

$100,000

and

$300,000

if

At the time we had the

discussion, the court had already dismissed the Homeowners
claim for punitive damages upon motion by the defendant
developers

in the prior lawsuit.
9.

During my negotiations with Mr. Busch, Mr.

DeBry recommended that I extend an offer to Busch to settle

-

the case for payment to the homeowners of $75,000. With Mr.
DeBry's consent, I made that offer to Mr. Busch, and the
offer was rejected.
10.

At no time during the settlement negotiations

did I request that only Graystone Homeowners Association's
name appear as a payee on the settlement check, that Mr.
DeBry's name should be omitted as a payee on the settlement
check or that the check be delivered directly to Graystone
rather than to DeBry.

^^XJohn Webster
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Stephen Roth, Esq.
Bruce R. Garner, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
H. Wayne Wadsworth, Esq.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
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-6-

* 0n>

R. 1245 - 1248

t fcr.'t ft £. ~ r- I
' - „ , :^'

*Vi'-»<.J

FILED !N r i r - f « 5 OFFICE

!

ArR N 4 i s PH '86
.".h

Randall S. Feil 1052
Thomas R. Vuksinick 3341
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN
57 West 200 South, Suite 400
American Plaza II
P.O. Box 3450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Intervenors
and Counter-Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY,
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WEBSTER
vs.
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION; ROBERT BUSCH;
RONALD COULAM; MELVIN
JENSEN; the partnership
Of SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU, JOHN WEBSTER
and Commercial Security Bank
Defendants,
vs.

Civil No. C83-5167
Judge Raymond S. Uno

JOHN WEBSTER, ROY NEILSON,
FLORENCE LEWON, CARLOS
CROFT and LOUISE MALLONEE
as the BOARD OF MANAGERS
OF THE GRAYSTONE PINES
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION on
behalf of the owners of all
the units in the Graystone
Pines Condominiums,
Intervenors and
Counter-Plaintiffs.

^isAlA^

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
John Webster, having been first duly sworn, deposes and
says as follows:
1.

I am a member of the Graystone Pines Homeowners'

Association

and

am named

as

a defendant

in

the above-

entitled action.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the events relating to

the prior

lawsuit, Civil

No. C79-763,

("prior lawsuit")

brought by the Graystone Pines Homeowners' Association on
behalf of the homeowners against Graystone Pines, Inc., and
Defendants Busch, Coulam and Jensen, ("Developers").

At the

time the prior lawsuit was tried and through the time that
the suit was

settled, and

until April

11, 1985, I was

president of Graystone Pines Homeowners' Association.
3.

On

June

29, 1983, Florence

Lewon, Roy Meilson,

Dorothy Croft (all members of the Homeowners' Association),
and I met with Robert DeBry in his office in an effort to
resolve

the

issues that had

arisen with respect to the

settlement of the prior lawsuit with the developers and Mr.
DeBry's claim for additional attorney's fees.
4.

Mr« DeBry was reluctant to discuss his attorney's

fee at the meeting; however, on behalf of the homeowners, I
offered

to

pay

Mr.

DeBry

30

percent

of

the

$61,000

settlement ($18,300) plus any costs or miscellaneous expense

he had incurred for which he had not been reimbursed.

Mr.

DeBry refused to accept the $18,300 plus costs and demanded
that he be paid a total of $31,300 plus $1,021.35 in costs.
5.

After Mr. DeBry's refusal to accept $18,300 as his

attorney's fee, he commenced this action in August, 1983,
seeking recovery of an attorney's fee in the sum of $31,300.
DATED this

^

day of April, 1986.
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this J/j^L-^day of
April, 1986.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WEBSTER, postage
prepaid, this

llfP\

day of April, 1986, to the following:

Stephen Roth, Esq.
Bruce R. Garner, Esq*
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & "MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
H. Wayne Wadsworth, Esq.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
310 South Main, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Robert J. DeBry, Esq.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
M. David Eckersley, Esq.
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY & DOWNES
419 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

wUd-

±

R. 1589 - 1590

not e?«4

October 9# 1980
John Webster
2710 Highland Drive
Apartment 12
Salt Lake City, Utah

84106

Dear John:
I would like to give you a report on the trial which
was recently concluded against Graystone Pines, Inc.
A trial really takes place in two separate stages.
The first stage of the trial deals with legal issues. The second
stage of the trial deals with factual issues.
At the close of all evidence, both parties make a series
of motions which deal with the legal aspects of the trial. For the
most part, those are all technical matters. After the judge has
ruled on those technical/legal matters, he can present the remaining
factual irsues to the jury.
In this trial, the defendant made a number of legal
motions after the evidence was submitted. I do not recall the exact
count; however, there were 10-15 separate motions argued. The judge
ruled in favor of the defendant on most of those motions. The result
was that the judge dismissed most of our case for technical/legal
reasons. In other words, he ruled that we lost the case on legal
technicalities; and there was no reason for the jury to make any
rulings on the facts.
Our next step is to appeal this judge's decision to
the Utah Supreme Court. I will pursue that matter vigorously. I
am confident that the Supreme Court will reverse Judge Taylor. If
the case is reversed, we will then go back and have a new trial.
The only difference will be that in the second trial, the various
legal technicalities will have been decided by the Supreme Court.
Thus, our second trial would really be to prove our case to the jury.
It is difficult to explain the judge's numerous rulings
because they were of such a technical nature. However, I will give
you one example. Approximately 1 1/2-2 years after everyone moved
in, a meeting was held with Mr. Busch. During that meeting, part

EXHIBIT 5
CLUTIKIIiD AS A SPECIALIST IN CIVIL TNIAI. ADVOCACY
BY THE NATIONAL IIOAHP O f TRIAL ADVOCACY
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Mr. John Webster
Page Two
October 9, 1980
of the conversation was to the effect that the homeowners demanded
that the roof be repaired according to specifications and suggestions
provided by Mr. Harwood. The judge ruled that such a conversation
is, in fact, a refusal to permit the developers to make repairs.
The judge ruled that if someone has a guaranty or warranty, he is
obligated to permit the contractor to make the repairs whenever and
however the contractor wants. According to the judge, a demand to
repair the roof in a certain way therefore nullifies the guaranty.
Since the judge ruled that the guaranty was nullified, there was
no issue to present to the jury.
Of course, we think the judge's ruling was incorrect;
and as stated above, we will appeal that ruling. However, that is
a sample of the type of technical rulings which a judge can make
as a basis for dismissing a case.
There was only one very small matter which the judge
did not dismiss. I believe that to be only about 10% of our case.
The judge ruled that the jury could decide whether or not the black
material on the carpet was coming from the attic and whether that
violated any implied warranty. It was my judgment that there would
be great danger in splitting up our case and submitting only 10?
of our case to the jury. Therefore, I agreed to dismiss that claim
so that we could keep the rest of the case together and appeal it
all together. There was some danger in dismissing that claim because
we may not be able to reinstate that claim at a later time. However,
I felt strongly that it would not be wise to submit that one isolated
issue to the jury. On the other hand, it is probable that we can
reinstate this claim at least under our theory of express warranty
if the Supreme Court rules in our favor.
Sincerely,

Robert J. DcBry
RJD:sg

R. 1631 - 1638

L. R. Gardiner, Jr. A1148
Thomas R. Vuksinick A3341
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN
American Plaza II, Suite 400
57 West 200 South
Post Office Box 45450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-7751
Attorneys for Intervenors
and Counter-Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY,
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WEBSTER
vs.
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION; ROBERT BUSCH;
RONALD COULAM; MELVIN
JENSEN; the partnership
of SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU, JOHN WEBSTER; and
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
Defendants,

Civil No. C83-5167
Judge Raymond S. Uno

vs.
JOHN WEBSTER, ROY NEILSON,
FLORENCE LEWON, CARLOS
CROFT and LOUISE MALLONEE
as the BOARD OF MANAGERS
OF THE GRAYSTONE PINES
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION on
behalf of the owners of all
the units in the Graystone
Pines Condominiums,
Intervenors and
Counter-Plaintiffs.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Having

been

first

duly

sworn, deposes

and

says

as

follows:
1.

I am a member of the Graystone Pines Homeowners

Association.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the events relating to

the prior
brought

law suit, Civil No. C79-763f

by

the Graystone

("Prior Lawsuit")

Pines Homeowners Association on

behalf of the Homeowners against Graystone Pines, Inc., and
the developers Busch, Coulam and Jensen ("Developers").

At

the time the Prior Lawsuit was tried and through the time
that suit

was settled, and until April 11, 1985, I was

president of Graystone Pines Homeowners Association.
3.

On or about November 9, 1978, the Homeowners hired

plaintiff,

attorney

Robert

Homeowners

Association

in

J.
the

DeBry,
Prior

to

represent

Lawsuit

the

against

the

developers who built the Graystone Pines condominiums.

The

complaint in the Prior Lawsuit was filed in 1979.
4.

DeBry was paid at an hourly rate of $50 per hour

for the time spent in prosecuting the Prior Lawsuit.
5.

The

attorney's

fees

and

expenses

incurred

in

litigating the Homeowners1 claims against the Developers were
more

than plaintiff

had

estimated

at

the outset.

This

increase in expenses greatly concerned the Homeowners, who

were for the most part

retired people on fixed incomes,

particularly since it appeared that the Homeowners1 claims
against the Developers were far from resolution.
were

had

with

plaintiff

concerning

the

Discussions

future

cost

of

litigation and possible changes in the initial fee agreement.
6.

In March 1980, a new compensation plan was proposed

by plaintiff

whereby

plaintiff

would

receive

30% of any

recovery achieved in the Prior Lawsuit in addition to the
fees

that

had

Homeowners.

already

been

paid

The Homeowners agreed

to

plaintiff

by

the

to the change to the

contingent fee agreement on March 27, 1980.
7.

The first trial on the Prior Lawsuit was begun on

September 16, 1980 and continued for eleven trial days to
October

lf

1980.

At

the

end

of

the

trial, the court

dismissed all of the Homeowners claims except their claim for
damage to the condominiums caused by a black substance

(the

"black substance" claim) which formed where the walls met the
floor

in

Graystone
consulting

many
Pines
with

areas

of

the

condominiums.
me

or

any

three

buildings

Plaintiff,
member

of

comprising

without
the

first

Homeowners

Association and without my or the Homeowners Association's
consent, then stipulated to dismissal of the black substance
claim with prejudice.

8.

Thereafter, plaintiff on the Homeowners1 behalff

appealed the dismissal of all the claims including the black
substance claim.

On July 20, 1982, the Utah Supreme Court

remanded for trial all of the dismissed claims except the
black substance claim which it refused to reinstate.

The

reinstated claims were set for trial in about mid-July 1983.
9.

Prior to the second trial, plaintiff and I had a

discussion regarding the likelihood of recovery in the event
it was necessary to have a second trial.
was a 75% chance of recovering
$80,000, a
$100,000,

50% chance
and

a

of

25% of

He told me there

from between

recovering
recovering

between
between

$300,000 if punitive damages were allowed.
had

the discussion, the court

Homeowners claim

had

$50,000 and

already

$80,000 and
$100,000

and

At the time we
dismissed

the

for punitive damages upon motion by the

defendant Developers in the Prior Lawsuit.
10.

Some months before the second trial was to begin,

plaintiff requested that I enter direct negotiations with the
Developers to see if a satisfactory settlement might be made.
Plaintiff

told

me

qualified

to

plaintiff

advised

handle

that

he

the
of

believed

negotiations

the

progress

that

I

than

he.

of

the

was

better
I kept

settlement

negotiations and he was made aware of each settlement offer

nQlG3&

before

it

was

occasions

that

made.
the

Mr.

DeBry

Homeowners

advised

were

free

me

on

several

to

accept

any

settlement offer with which they were comfortable.
11.

I kept plaintiff

advised

of each

settlement negotiations with the Developers.

step

in the

In March 1983,

the Homeowners suggested to the Developers that the prior
litigation

be

settled

Developers

responded

for

that

$98,470.

In

May

they were willing

$30f000 to settle the case.

1983,

the

to pay only

The Homeowners, with plaintiff's

consent, countered with an offer to settle for $75,000.

In

early June 1983 about five weeks before the second trial, the
Developers responded by rejecting the $75,000 and offering to
pay $47,000 to settle.

The highest settlement offer the

Developers had made prior to completion of the first trial in
the Prior Lawsuit had been $45,000.
12.

Further negotiations were had with the Developers.

In mid-June 1983 the Developers agreed to settle the Prior
Lawsuit by paying
refused
$61,000.

to

approve

the Homeowners $61,000.
settlement

of

the

Prior

The plaintiff
Lawsuit

for

He also refused to accept the contingent fee of 30%

of the recovery as provided in his March 4, 1980 letter as
his fee.

Instead, he advised me that if the Prior Lawsuit

were settled for $61,000, he would demand a fee of $31,300

which he said he had calculated based on an hourly rate of
$50 per hour and his "reconstruction" of the number of hours
he had worked.
13.

On June 29, 1983f

Florence Lewon, Roy Neilsonf

Dorothy Croft (all members of the Homeowners Association) and
I met with plaintiff in his office in an effort to resolve
the issues that had arisen with respect to the settlement of
the

Prior

Lawsuit

attorney's fees.

and

Mr.

DeBry's

claim

Plaintiff was reluctant

for

additional

to discuss his

attorney's fee at that meeting; howeverf on behalf of the
Homeowners, I offered to pay plaintiff 30% of the $61f000
settlement ($18,300) plus any costs and miscellaneous expense
he had incurred for which he had not been reimbursed.

Mr.

DeBry refused to accept the $18,300 plus costs and demanded
that he be paid a total of $31,300 plus costs.

At that

meeting plaintiff told us that he would not go along with the
settlement because he felt he could get more if the case were
tried and that he could not as a matter of "professional
pride" approve a settlement for $61,000.
14.

Plaintiff was going on vacation during the month

of July, and so, was not available to appear at the second
trial of the Prior Lawsuit in mid-July 1983.

Plaintiff had,

however, made arrangements with another attorney to appear at
the

second

trial

on

behalf

of

the

Homeowners.

As

compensation for his appearance, the other attorney was to

001636

receive 2/3 of plaintiff's 30% contingent fee if the case
were tried.

As I understood it, the other attorney's portion

of the contingent fee was to increase as the trial date
approached.

If the Prior Lawsuit were settled before July 1,

1983, the other attorney would receive 5% of the recovery.
If it were settled after July 1, 1983 but before trial, he
would receive 10% of the recovery.

If the Prior Lawsuit were

settled after trial had begun, the other attorney was to
receive a full 20% of any recovery.
15.

Plaintiff worked with the Homeowners from 1979

through 1983 when the Prior Lawsuit was settled.
time he was both advised
to avoid

both

the

During that

and aware of the Homeowners1 desire

expense and

stress

of

process to the extent reasonably possible.

the

litigation

He also knew that

the Homeowners were generally comprised of older, retired
people whose fixed incomes made it difficult for them to pay
the costs of litigation.
16.

Immediately

settlement,
Homeowners

plaintiff
Association

$1,021.35 in costs.

following
filed
seeking

a

the

conclusion

complaint
recovery

of

of

the

against

the

$31,300

plus

DATED this &&//( day of December, 1986 •
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